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Abstract—A nation-scale firewall, colloquially referred to as
the “Great Firewall of China,” implements many different types
of censorship and content filtering to control China’s Internet
traffic. Past work has shown that the firewall occasionally fails.
In other words, sometimes clients in China are able to reach
blacklisted servers outside of China. This phenomenon has not
yet been characterized because it is infeasible to find a large and
geographically diverse set of clients in China from which to test
connectivity.
In this paper, we overcome this challenge by using hybrid idle
scan techniques that are able to measure connectivity between
a remote client and an arbitrary server, neither of which are
under the control of the researcher performing measurements.
In addition to hybrid idle scans, we present and employ a novel
side channel in the Linux kernel’s SYN backlog. We demonstrate
both techniques by measuring the reachability of the Tor network
which is known to be blocked in China. Our measurements
reveal that 1) failures in the firewall occur throughout the entire
country without any conspicuous geographical patterns, 2) a
network block in China appears to have unfiltered access to
parts of the Tor network, and 3) the filtering seems to be mostly
centralized at the level of Internet exchange points. Our work also
answers many other open questions about the Great Firewall’s
architecture and implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than 600 million Internet users are located behind the
world’s most sophisticated and pervasive censorship system:
the Great Firewall of China (GFW) [1]. Brought to life in
2003, the GFW has a tight grip on several layers of the TCP/IP
model and is known to block or filter IP addresses [2], TCP
ports [2], DNS requests [3], [4], [5], HTTP requests [6], [7],
[8], circumvention tools, and even social networking sites [9].
This pervasive censorship gives rise to numerous circum-
vention tools seeking to evade the GFW by exploiting a
number of opportunities [10]. Of particular interest is the Tor
anonymity network [11] whose arms race with the operators
of the GFW now counts several iterations. Once having had
30,000 users solely from China, the Tor network now is
largely inaccessible from within China’s borders as illustrated
in Figure 1.
The amount of users trying to connect to the Tor net-
work indicates that there is a strong need for practical and
scalable circumvention tools. Censorship circumvention, how-
ever, builds on censorship analysis. A solid understanding
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Fig. 1. The approximate amount of directly connecting Tor users (as opposed
to connecting over bridges) for the first months of 2014. While the number
of users varies, it rarely exceeds 3,000.
of censorship systems is necessary in order to design sound
and sustainable circumvention systems. However, it is diffi-
cult to analyze Internet censorship without controlling either
the censored source machine or its—typically uncensored—
communication destination. This problem is usually tackled
by obtaining access to censored source machines, finding
open proxies, renting virtual systems, or by cooperating with
volunteers inside the censoring country. In the absence of these
possibilities, censorship analysis has to resort to observing
traffic on the server’s side and inferring what the client is
seeing.
Our work fills this gap by presenting and evaluating
network measurement techniques which can be used to ex-
pose censorship while controlling neither the source nor the
destination machine. This puts our study in stark contrast to
previous work which had to rely on proxies or volunteers, both
of which provide limited coverage of the censor’s networks. By
being mostly independent of source and destination machines,
we are able to shed light on entirely unexplored areas of
the Internet. We evaluate our techniques by applying them to
the Tor anonymity network, thereby handing the Tor Project
practical tools to measure the reachability of their network.
Such tools are needed because bridges1 are frequently blocked
in China without the bridge operators or the Tor Project notic-
ing [12]. Our work makes it possible to test the reachability
1Bridges are “hidden” Tor relays which are not listed in the public network
consensus.
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of these bridges without having a vantage point in China.
As a result, the Tor Project is able to learn which subset
of bridges is still reachable and hence undiscovered by the
GFW. This knowledge facilitates the optimization of bridge
distribution [13], e.g., bridges blocked in China are only given
out to users outside China.
Our techniques are currently limited to testing basic IP
connectivity. Thus, we can only detect censorship on lower
layers of the network stack, i.e., before a TCP connection is
even established. This kind of low-level censorship is very
important to the censors, however. For example, while social
media controls on domestic sites in China, such as Weibo, can
be very sophisticated, users would simply use alternatives such
as Facebook if the low-level IP address blocking were not in
place to prevent this. Also, deep packet inspection (DPI) does
not scale as well in terms of raw traffic as does lower-level
filtering. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our techniques are
not applicable if censors only make use of DPI to block Tor
as it was or is done by Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, and Syria [14].
We are interested not only in finding patterns in the
GFW’s failures, but also in gaining a better understanding
of how the GFW is architected within China’s backbone and
provincial networks and whether previously observed details
of its implementation are observed throughout the country.
To this end, we focus our efforts on testing the following
hypotheses that will illuminate the GFW’s architecture and
implementation. All hypotheses are with respect to the filtering
of TCP/IP packets based on IP addresses and port numbers.
Hypothesis 1. In general, from any client to any destination if
a SYN packet is filtered by the GFW then a RST with the same
source, destination, and port numbers will also be filtered. For
brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as “RSTs are treated the
same as SYNs.”
Hypothesis 2. There are no conspicuous geographic patterns
in the GFW’s failures. In other words, failures can occur in
any part of the country. For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis
as “No geographic patterns in failures.”
Hypothesis 3. In general, the GFW blocks Tor relays by drop-
ping SYN/ACK segments with IP address and port information
that matches known Tor relays. Other types of filtering seen
for Tor relays in China (e.g., dropping SYN segments) are a
negligible fraction of the censorship. For brevity, we refer to
this hypothesis as “server-to-client blocking.”
Hypothesis 4. At least some of the failures of the GFW
are persistent, meaning that the client and server are able to
communicate throughout the day. Note that this could also be
due to intentionally whitelisted destinations, but in this paper
we refer to all cases where clients in China can access Tor
relays as “failures.” For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as
“some failures are persistent.”
Hypothesis 5. At least some of the failures of the GFW
exhibit diurnal patterns, where a client and blacklisted server
can communicate at some times of the day but not others.
For brevity, we refer to this hypothesis as “some failures have
diurnal patterns.”
Hypothesis 6. In general, packets that are subject to censor-
ship traverse at least one or two hops, and sometimes more,
into China before they are dropped by the GFW. For brevity,
we refer to this hypothesis as “blocking is in the backbone.”
By testing the above hypotheses, we further increase the
public’s knowledge about the GFW and by presenting and
evaluating our measurement techniques, we equip circumven-
tion system developers with a set of tools to analyze and
debug censorship incidents. In summary, this paper makes the
following contributions:
• We describe the first real-world application of the
hybrid idle scan [15], [16] to a large-scale Inter-
net measurement problem, in which we measure the
connectivity between the Tor anonymity network and
clients in China over a period of four weeks.
• We present and evaluate a novel side channel based
on the Linux kernel’s SYN backlog which enables
indirect detection of packet loss.
• We increase the community’s understanding of how
the GFW is architected and how its blocking of the Tor
network looks from different clients all over China.
• We publish our code under a free license to encourage
further research.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We discuss
some background of the GFW in Section II and our mea-
surement techniques in Section III, which is then followed
by our experimental methodology in Section IV. We analyze
the data we gathered and present results in Section V and
proceed with a discussion of our results in Section VI. Related
work is covered in Section VII and the paper is concluded in
Section VIII.
II. MOTIVATION AND GFW BACKGROUND
The hypotheses enumerated in Section I were chosen
because we wanted to address the following open questions
about the GFW:
• Are there geographic or other spatial patterns in the
GFW’s failures? This is important because such pat-
terns could be exploited by evasion technologies if the
patterns exist, but if no such patterns exist then evasion
efforts should focus on other aspects of the GFW.
• Are there temporal patterns in the GFW’s failures?
There are many different evasion efforts that periodi-
cally test their methods to see if they have been de-
tected and blocked by the GFW. A solid understanding
of temporal patterns (such as diurnal patterns) will
help these projects to better understand the results of
their tests.
• What kinds of packets are filtered in different parts of
the country? This is important, because if an evasion
technology is tested in, e.g., Beijing but then fails to
work in another part of the country, the developers of
the evasion technology need to understand why.
• Where in China’s Internet backbone does the filtering
occur, and what is the role of routing? If an evasion
technology is being tested from two different sources
in China or two different destinations outside the
country, the developers of the evasion technology may
observe two different results for their tests and they
need a good understanding of why this occurs.
Now we give more details about what was known before
the work presented in this paper. A more comprehensive
overview of previous work is given in Section VII.
A. Spatial patterns
Ensafi et al. [15], [16] found that a small percentage of
tests showed no signs of censorship. Their tests, like ours, were
taken between clients in China paired with Tor relays outside
China. However, their experimental methodology was designed
to test if the failures in the censorship observed by Winter and
Lindskog [2] were also observed outside of Beijing or not.
Ensafi et al. made no attempt to choose clients or servers so
that spatial patterns could be identified. Our experiments were
specifically designed to identify spatial and geographic patterns
in the GFW’s failures.
B. Temporal patterns
Neither Ensafi et al. nor Winter and Lindskog attempted
to characterize temporal patterns in the GFW’s failures. This
kind of characterization is difficult because, for a general
understanding of temporal patterns, spatial patterns must be
fully understood. Otherwise temporal patterns may be specific
to one location. Also, temporal patterns are difficult to extract
from idle scan measurements because of noise. This is why,
in our experiments, we used traceroutes from a Tor relay to
analyze temporal patterns.
C. Details of the filtering
What kinds of packets are filtered? This is a key question,
especially for evasion technologies that seek to evade the GFW
via insertion and evasion in the IP and TCP layers. Winter
and Lindskog described detailed results about what happens
to SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK, and RST packets, but their results
were specific to one location in China: Beijing. Also, any of
their experiments that required observation on the server were
only able to be carried out between Beijing and one Tor relay
in Sweden. Ensafi et al. had more spatial diversity in their
experiments, but because of the nature of their hybrid idle scan
the only packets that can be tested are SYN/ACKs from server
to client and RSTs from client to server. SYN packets or any
kind of stateful connection cannot be tested with the hybrid
idle scan. All of these limitations in previous approaches is
why our experiments include another—previously unknown—
idle scan that uses the SYN backlog to make more general
inferences with a wider spatial variety.
D. Architecture of the GFW
There are generally regarded to be three theories about how
the GFW is architected, posited in technical papers [17], [18],
[6], [19] or other media [20], [21]. One theory posits that the
filtering occurs at choke points where oversea cables carrying
international Internet traffic enter the country. Another theory
is that the majority of the filtering occurs in three big Internet
exchange points in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou [22],
near where international traffic enters the country but posi-
tioned more at central points in China’s backbone network.
A third theory that has been discussed is the possibility that
the filtering occurs—or may increasingly occur as the GFW
evolves—at the provincial level [18].
Our results about where the filtering of SYN/ACKs from
Tor relays occurs are largely congruent with Xu et al.’s results
about where RST injection based on deep packet inspection
occurs. In their results, CNCGROUP performed most of its
RST injection in the backbone, while CHINANET performed
this type of censorship at the provincial level. Since their study,
CNCGROUP has bought CHINANET, but the censorship at
both the backbone and provincial levels, in about the same
proportions as reported by Xu et al., is also apparent in our
results. This means that the routers that perform port mirroring
for deep packet inspection are probably the same routers that
enforce access controls such as blocking Tor by source IP
address and TCP port. It also means that where the filtering
occurs has not changed significantly since the study performed
by Xu et al..
In addition to providing more information about where
the filtering occurs, our work presented in this paper raises
interesting questions about how the GFW is architected, both
in terms of implementations at routers and in terms of the big
picture. Winter and Lindskog observed that for Tor relays only
the SYN/ACK from the server is blocked, not the SYN from
the client to the server. One of our key results in this paper is
that this observation also applies to China in general for a lot
of different geographic locations. This raises a question: why
block SYN/ACKs in the one direction, but not SYNs in the
other?
One possible theory might be that the Border Gateway Pro-
tocol (BGP) plays a key role in the censorship by causing all
international traffic to flow through the routers that implement
the censorship. Because the GFW operators are presumably
restricted to announcing BGP routes for autonomous systems
(ASes) that are in China, they can only control routing in the
direction of traffic that is entering China. Hence SYN/ACKs
from Tor relays outside China to clients in China are blocked
almost all the time, while SYNs from clients in China to Tor
relays outside China are much less likely to be blocked.
Another theory is based on speculating about the way
the GFW operators monitor traffic to decide what to block.
In a description of the GFW written in Chinese by “Xylon
Pan” [23], it is speculated that this is done because the
server in an HTTP connection typically sends a lot more
content to the client than the client sends to the server. Thus
Netflow aggregation in the server-to-client direction works
better, because there is more traffic to be sampled. One theory
put forward by Xylon Pan is that since the GFW’s operators
think about network flows in the server-to-client direction, so
they also write access controls (such as the blocking of Tor by
IP address and TCP port) for the server-to-client direction.
The reason why this one-way blocking property (where
SYN/ACKs entering China are much more likely to be blocked
than SYNs leaving China) exists is left for future work. The
major contribution of our present work in this regard is to
confirm that this property is a general property that is observed
all over China, not just in the one or two locations where
previous tests [2], [23] have been performed.
III. NETWORKING BACKGROUND
The research questions we seek to answer require high ge-
ographical diversity of clients in China. Typically, such a study
would only be possible if we could find and control vantage
points in all of China’s provinces. Instead, we exploit side
channels allowing us to detect intentional packet dropping—
without controlling the two affected machines. In particular,
we use hybrid idle scans (see Section III-C) and SYN backlog
scans (see Section III-A). The idea behind these side channels
as well as their prerequisites are discussed in this section.
A. Side channels in Linux’s SYN backlog
A performance optimization in the Linux kernel’s SYN
backlog can be used to detect intentional packet drop-
ping. Half-open TCP connections of network applications are
queued in the kernel’s SYN backlog whose size defaults to 256.
These half-open connections then turn into fully established
TCP connections once the server’s SYN/ACK was acknowl-
edged by the client. If a proper response is not received for
an entry in the SYN backlog, it will retransmit the SYN/ACK
several times. However, if the SYN/ACK and its respective
retransmissions are never acknowledged by the client, the half-
open connection is removed from the backlog. When under
heavy load or under attack, a server’s backlog might fill faster
than it can be processed. This causes attempted TCP connec-
tions to not be fully handled while pending TCP connections
time out. The Linux kernel mitigates this problem by pruning
an application’s SYN backlog. If the backlog becomes more
than half full, the kernel begins to reduce the number of
SYN/ACK retransmissions for all pending connections [24].
As a result, half-open connections will time out earlier which
should bring the SYN backlog back into uncritical state. We
show that the Linux kernel’s pruning mechanism—by design
a shared resource—opens a side channel which can be used
to measure intentional packet drops targeting a server. This is
possible without controlling said server.
Our key insight is that we can remotely measure the ap-
proximate size of a server’s SYN backlog by sending SYN seg-
ments and counting the number of corresponding SYN/ACK
retransmissions. Starting with version number 2.2, the Linux
kernel retransmits unacknowledged SYN/ACK segments five
times [25]. As a result, we expect to receive the full number
of five retransmissions when querying a service whose SYN
backlog is less than half full. If, on the other hand, the backlog
becomes more than half full, we will observe less than five
retransmissions. When applied to the problem of intentional
packet dropping, this allows us to infer whether a firewall
blocks TCP connections by dropping the client’s SYN or the
server’s SYN/ACK segment.
It is worth mentioning that a server’s backlog state can also
be inferred by coercing it into using SYN cookies [26]. A server
using SYN cookies reveals that its SYN backlog is completely
full. However, this measurement technique is effectively a SYN
flood and TCP connections which were established using SYN
cookies suffer from reduced throughput due to the lack of
flow control window scaling. In contrast to triggering SYN
cookies, our technique has no negative impact on servers or
other clients’ connections, when applied carefully.
B. The global IP identifier
IP identifiers (IPIDs) are unique numbers assigned to IP
packets in case they are fragmented along a path. The receiving
party is able to reassemble the fragmented packets by looking
at their IPID field. Most modern TCP/IP stacks increment
the IPID field per connection or randomize it, as opposed to
globally incrementing it. A machine with a globally increment-
ing IPID keeps a global counter that is incremented by 1 for
every packet the machine sends, regardless of the destination
IP address. Being a shared resource, the IPID can be used
by a measurement machine talking to a remote machine to
estimate how many packets the remote machine has sent to
other machines. Throughout this paper, we refer to machines
with globally incrementing IPIDs as simply machines with
“global IPIDs.”
C. Hybrid idle scan
Ensafi et al. [15], [16] discovered a new method for
remotely detecting intentional packet drops on the Internet
via side channel inferences. Their technique can discover
packet drops (e.g., caused by censorship) between two remote
machines, as well as infer in which direction the packet drops
are occurring. The only major requirements for their approach
are a client with a global IPID and a target server with an
open port. Access to the client or the server is not required.
Conceptually, the hybrid idle scan technique can turn approxi-
mately 1% of the total IPv4 address space [15] into conscripted
measurement machines that can be used as vantage points
to measure IP address-based censorship—without having root
access on those machines. This is why we employ the hybrid
idle scan technique for our geographic study of how Tor is
blocked in China.
As shown in Figure 3, the hybrid idle scan implementation
queries the IPID of the client to create a time series. By sending
SYN/ACKs from the measurement machine and receiving RST
responses, the IPID of the client can be recorded. The time
series is used to compare a base case (when no traffic is
being generated other than noise) to a period of time when
the server is sending SYN/ACKs to the client (because of our
forged SYNs). Recall that the hybrid idle scan assumes that
the client’s IPID is global and the server has an open port. By
comparing two phases, one phase where no SYN packets are
sent to the server and one phase where SYN packets are sent
to the server with the return IP address spoofed to appear to
be from the client, the hybrid idle scan technique can detect
three different cases (plus an error case), shown in Figure 2,
with respect to IP packets being dropped by the network in
between the client and the server:
1) Server-to-client-dropped: SYN/ACKs are dropped
in transit from the server to the client causing the
client’s IPID to not increase at all (except for noise).
See Figure 3(a).
2) No-packets-dropped: If no intentional packet drop-
ping is happening, the client’s IPID will go up by
exactly one. See Figure 3(b). This happens because
the server’s SYN/ACK is unsolicited and answered
by the client with a RST segment causing the server
to remove the entry from its SYN backlog and not
retransmit the SYN/ACK.
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Fig. 2. Three different cases of packet dropping that our method can detect. MM is our measurement machine.
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(a) Detected as server-to-client-drop.
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(b) Detected as no-packets-dropped.
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(c) Detected as client-to-server-drop.
Fig. 3. Each subfigure illustrates a time series based on IPID differences for a specific blocking case. Despite high amounts of noise, our ARMA modeling
can still detect the blocking case correctly.
3) Client-to-server-dropped: The RST responses sent
by the client to the server are dropped in transit.
In this case, the server will continue to retransmit
SYN/ACKs and the client’s IPID will get incremented
by the total number of (re)transmitted SYN/ACKs,
which is typically three to six. See Figure 3(c). This
may indicate null routing, the simplest method for
blacklisting an IP address.
4) Error: A measurement error happens if networking
errors occur during the experiment, the IPID is found
to not be global throughout the experiment, a model
is fit to the data but does not match any of the
three non-error cases above, the data is too noisy and
intervention analysis fails because we are not able to
fit a model to the data, and/or other errors.
Auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) models are used
to distinguish these cases. This overcomes autocorrelated noise
in IPID values (e.g., due to packet loss, packet delay, or other
traffic that the client is receiving). More details about the
ARMA modeling are described by Ensafi et al. [15], [16].
D. The Tor network
The Tor network [11] is an overlay network which provides
its users with anonymity on the Internet. Tor clients expose
a local SOCKS interface which is used to anonymize TCP
streams such as web traffic. As of April 2014, the network
consists of approximately 4,500 volunteer-run relays, nine di-
rectory authorities, and one bridge authority. While the relays
anonymize the network traffic of Tor clients, the authorities’
task is to keep track of all relays and to vote on and publish the
network consensus which Tor clients need in order to bootstrap.
It is trivial for censors to download the hourly published
network consensus and block all IP address/TCP port pairs
found in it. Other circumvention systems suffer from the same
problem [27].
All authorities are hard-coded in the Tor source code and
their IP addresses remain static. As a result, they constitute
attractive choke points for censors. In fact, blocking the IP
addresses of all nine directory authorities is sufficient to
prevent direct connections to the Tor network.2 Our study
focuses on the reachability of the authorities and relays, as it
is known that the GFW is blocking them [2]. Our focus is on
gathering more details about this blocking and characterizing
it with a large-scale spatiotemporal study.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the challenges our experimental
methodology was designed to address, the data sets we col-
lected, how our measurements help us to test the hypotheses
enumerated in Section I, and other issues.
A. Encountered challenges
Over the course of running our experiments and analyzing
our data, we faced a number of challenges which we discuss
here.
Churn in the Tor network: While the size of the Tor
network does not vary considerably over a short period of
time, the network’s churn rate can render longitudinal studies
difficult. For example, the median size of Tor’s network
consensus (i.e., the number of Tor relays in the network)
in March 2014 was 5,286. In total, however, March has
seen 13,343 unique relays—many of which were online for
only hours. To minimize the chance of selecting unstable
Tor relays for longitudinal studies, only relays having earned
the “Stable” flag should be considered [28]. Furthermore, the
relay descriptor archives could be examined to calculate a
relay’s reachability over time [29]. We selected only Tor relays
that had an uptime of at least five days, and filtered out all
data points where a node appeared to have left the network.
After having run our experiments, we removed one Tor relay
in Argentina from our data because its Tor and web ports
switched during our experiments.
Geolocation of routers: For geolocating routers, we used
MaxMind’s GeoIP2 City database [30]. As of April 2014, this
database lacks accurate geolocation information for backbone
routers in China. While provincial routers can typically be
mapped to their province based on whois records, backbone
routers are all mapped to the same bogus location at latitude
35 and longitude 105 which resides in an unpopulated area in
central China. We also used MaxMind for geolocating clients,
for which it is fairly accurate. For the location of routers, we
used a combination of whois information and round-trip delays
per hop. We discarded hops in our data that have whois records
from China but are actually in Hong Kong or Pasadena, CA
(where ChinaNet has a Point of Presence).
Diurnal patterns: For most measurements in this paper,
we measured once per hour throughout the day. This avoids
bias and distortion. For example, if we measured one set of
clients in the morning and one set at night, differences between
the two sets of clients may be due to different traffic patterns at
the different times of day and not a property of the different
set of clients. Thus we always randomize the order of our
experiments when possible and repeat all measurements every
hour for at least one full day.
2Note that the Tor Project designed and implemented so-called bridges to
tackle this very problem but the details are outside the scope of this work.
B. Experimental design and setup
Over the course of our experiments, we made use of three
sets of Linux-based measurement machines in the U.S., China,
and Europe. These three sets of machines correspond to the
three main datasets that we collected.
Machines in the U.S.: The three machines used for our
hybrid idle scans (see Section III-C) and SYN backlog scans
(see Section III-A) were located at our university campus (UC)
at the University of New Mexico. All machines had a direct
link to a research network which is free from packet filtering
and does not conduct egress filtering to block spoofed return
IP addresses. Furthermore, the UC measurement machines
have IP addresses that are not bound to any interfaces in
order to eliminate unsolicited network packets. For example, a
measurement machine’s kernel should never send a RST when
it receives a SYN/ACK. The data set collected using the hybrid
idle scan from these machines is a large-scale geographic
pairing of many clients (in China and other countries) with
many Tor relays and web servers around the world (mostly
outside China). It complements the other data sets discussed
below because it gives a complete cross-section of censorship
between many clients and many servers. This data will be used
to test Hypotheses 2 (no geographical patterns in failures)
and 4 (some failures are persistent).
VPS in China: We rented a virtual private system (VPS) in
China. The system was located in Beijing (AS 23028) and was
used for our SYN backlog scans discussed in Section III-A.
Our VPS provider employed a transparent and stateful TCP
proxy in front of our VPS which silently dropped unsolicited
segments. We carefully implemented our SYN backlog scans
so they first established state whenever necessary to be unaf-
fected by the TCP proxy. These SYN backlog scans provide
a dataset that speaks to our assumptions about how China
blocks Tor. It complements the hybrid idle scan data set
because, although the measurements are from a single client
in China, it allows us see exactly how that client experiences
the censorship. This data will be used to test Hypotheses 1
(RSTs are treated the same as SYNs) and 3 (server to client
blocking).
Tor relay in Europe: We used a long-established Tor
relay at Karlstad University in Sweden for our traceroute
measurements discussed in Section IV-B3. The relay has been
part of the Tor network for several months, and using our VPS
we manually verified it to be blocked in China. This data set
shows blocking between one Tor relay and many clients in
China. It complements the hybrid idle scan data set because
access to the Tor relay allows us to collect more details about
the blocking. This data will be used to test Hypotheses 4 (some
failures are persistent), 5 (some failures have diurnal patterns),
and 6 (blocking is in the backbone).
We now present our probing infrastructure as well as our
measurement methodology used to investigate the theories
posited in Section III.
1) Hybrid idle scans: Recall that by using hybrid idle
scans, we have more freedom in choosing clients in different
regions to test their reachability to different servers. Our goal
is to determine blocking of Tor relays (outside of China) from
the perspective of a large and geographically diverse set of
clients (within China).
We are interested in knowing whether there exist different
experiences of the censorship of Tor for different users in
different regions. Past work showed that a small fraction of
all Tor relays was accessible from a single vantage point
in Beijing [2], but what about the rest of the country? Key
questions are: how does the GFW’s architecture and China’s
routing affect censorship in different regions?
IP address selection: We selected clients in China (CN),
North America (NA), and Europe (EU). In order to be able to
select random IP addresses in China without favoring specific
locations—especially large cities featuring a vast number of
allocated IP addresses—we divided the map of China into
33 ∗ 65 cells corresponding to one degree of latitude and
longitude. We filled this grid with all IP addresses in Max-
Mind’s database that were documented to be in China. Then,
we collected IP addresses by randomly selecting a cell from
our grid after checking that they employed global IPIDs. In an
analogous manner, clients from the EU and NA were chosen
by horizontally scanning these regions. After 24 hours, we
gathered a pool of IP addresses that belonged to machines
with a global IPID. Then, we continually checked the selected
IP addresses for a 24-hour period to discard IP addresses that
changed global IPID behavior, went down, or were too noisy.
At the end we had 11 NA, 7 EU, and 161 CN clients to use
for our measurements.
Servers were chosen from three groups: Tor relays, Tor
directory authorities, and web servers. Tor relays were down-
loaded from a Tor relay status list [31]. We only selected relays
with an uptime greater than five days. In order to select Tor
relays in geographically diverse regions, we selected 10 Tor
relays from Europe, 13 from the United States, 20 from Russia,
and 101 from other countries. This way, our selected Tor relays
were not biased toward Europe or the U.S., which exhibit more
relays per capita than other regions. The 10 Tor authorities
were obtained from the Tor source code. Web servers were
chosen randomly from Alexa’s top 50 websites in China [32].
All web server and Tor relay IP addresses were checked hourly
to make sure that they stayed up for at least 24 hours before
being selected for our measurement.
The geographic distribution of our Tor relays as well as all
clients in China is illustrated in Figure 4.
Creating a complete bipartite graph: We used three
machines at UC (our university campus) to run the hybrid idle
scan experiments. We started the experiments with 180 clients
and 176 servers. Each day 20 clients and approximately 20
servers were selected for each of the machines. For 22 hours3,
every hour, we performed the hybrid idle scan for each possible
pair of client and server. Every “scan round” performs: 1) two
minutes of hybrid idle scans, 2) 30 seconds of sending RSTs
to clear the server’s backlog, and 3) five seconds of testing the
client to assure that they remained online and kept their global
IPID. Similar checks are performed to ensure that servers
remain online throughout each experiment. At any given time,
each IP address (client or server) was involved in only one
test. After 27 days, each client’s reachability was tested to all
servers, i.e, our clients and servers created a bipartite graph.
For more details about the experiment design refer to Ensafi et
al. [15], [16].
3Two hours per day were reserved for server data synchronization.
Pruning the data: We used the selected IP addresses
throughout our experiments. Naturally, some of the hosts went
down or were occasionally too noisy. Also, the host behind an
IP address can change, e.g., a client with a global IPID might
lose its DHCP lease and get replaced with a client running a
random IPID. To account for these issues, we perform tests
throughout our experiments which cull out data points where
basic assumptions are not met. For every server involved in
the experiment, we had two checks: liveliness and the stable
Tor flag test. After each scan, for five seconds we sent five
SYN segments per second using UC’s unbound IP address.
The data point passed the liveliness test only if it retransmits
three or more SYN/ACKs. Also, if the server was a Tor relay,
we verified that the relay was assigned the “Stable” flag (cf.
Section IV-A).
For every client, for five seconds, we sent five SYN/ACKs
per second using UC’s unbound IP address. We expect the
client to respond with RST segments totaling in number to
more than half the number of sent SYN/ACKs. If this is the
case then the data point passes the client’s liveliness test. The
results of a scan were allowed into the data set only if both
the client and server passed their checks. Note that each data
point is one client and one server tested one time in a given
hour. There was a several-hour network outage that caused a
hole in a portion of one day of our data.
After culling out data that did not meet our basic assump-
tions, we were left with 36% of the total data collected. This
36% is the data described in Section V and used for our
analysis.
2) Backlog scans: After having presented the underlying
side channel in Section III-A, we now discuss the implemen-
tation of our two backlog scan types which can answer two
questions, 1) “Do SYN segments from China reach a Tor
relay?” and 2) “Do RST segments from China reach a Tor
relay?”. Basically, we answer both questions by first transmit-
ting crafted TCP segments to a relay, thus manipulating its
SYN backlog, and then querying its backlog size by counting
the relay’s SYN/ACK retransmissions. The conceptual imple-
mentation of both scan types is illustrated in Figure 5.
SYN scan: The SYN scan—depicted in Figure 5(a)—is
started by MM by sending five SYN segments to Tor in order
to infer the relay’s backlog size when under stress.4 After a
delay of approximately 500 ms, VPS proceeds by sending 145
SYN segments whose purpose is to fill the relay’s backlog by
more than half. Recall that the backlog size defaults to 256, so
we only fill the backlog to 59%. That way, we can make the
Tor relay’s kernel prune MM’s SYN segments, thus reducing
their retransmissions. Finally, MM knows that VPS’s SYNs
reached the relay if the number of SYN/ACK retransmissions
for its five SYNs is lower than five. Otherwise, VPS’s SYNs
did not reach the relay. This type of inference is necessary
because, most of the time, China’s GFW drops SYN/ACKs
from known Tor relays.
RST scan: Our RST scan incorporates an additional step
but is based on the same principle. As illustrated in Figure 5(b),
MM starts by sending 10 SYN segments whose purpose is,
4We transmit five SYN segments rather than just one to account for packet
loss.
Fig. 4. The geographic distribution of all tested Tor relays (shown as onions) and of our global IPID clients in China (shown as red marks). Note that outside
of Xinjiang the west of China has very little Internet penetration, which is why we have few data points in this region and the distribution is biased towards the
eastern parts of China. (Map data c© 2014 Google, INEGI)
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Fig. 5. The two types of backlog scans we employ. The purpose of these scans is to verify if 1) SYN segments from China reach a Tor relay and if 2) RST
segments from China reach a Tor relay.
analogous to the SYN scan, to monitor the relay’s backlog
size. Afterwards, MM proceeds by sending 145 spoofed SYN
segments with VPS’s source address. Note that we cannot send
the SYN segments from VPS as they might be blocked. By
sending spoofed SYN segments from an unfiltered network
link, we can ensure that the segments reach the Tor relay.
Upon receiving the SYN segment burst, the relay replies with
SYN/ACK segments which we expect to be dropped by the
GFW. In the final step, VPS sends a burst of RST segments to
the Tor relay. The RST segments are crafted so that every
RST segment corresponds to one of the relay’s SYN/ACK
segments. The purpose of the RST burst is to terminate all
half-open connections, thus clearing the relay’s backlog. Based
on how many retransmissions we observe for the 10 “probing
SYNs”, we can infer whether the RST segments were dropped
by the GFW or not. Receiving five retransmissions means
that the backlog was not cleared and the RST segments were
dropped. Receiving less than five retransmissions means that
the backlog was successfully cleared and the RST segments
were not dropped by the GFW. This kind of inference is
necessary because machines outside China cannot measure
directly what happens to RST packets sent from China, and
machines inside China are very limited in their ability to infer
what is happening on blocked IP address/TCP port pairs.
Implementation: We implemented our scans using a col-
lection of bash scripts and a patched version of the tool
hping3 [33]. Accurate timing was crucial for our experiments.
To keep the clock of our machines synchronized, we used the
tool ntp which implements the network time protocol. Recall
that the SYN backlog behavior we are exploiting is limited
to Linux kernels (cf. Section III-A). As a result, our scans
targeted the subset of 94 out of our 144 Tor relays which
are known to run Linux. Tor relays periodically publish their
server descriptors—which includes their operating system—to
all directory authorities so there is no need for us to guess the
operating system of Tor relays.
Pruning the data: By pruning the backlog scan data, we
aim to make sure that the relay runs an unmodified Linux
TCP/IP stack. After scanning a relay, we send three “baseline
SYNs” to it in order to query its original amount of SYN/ACK
retransmissions. First, we discard scans in which the relay
never sent five SYN/ACK retransmissions, Linux’s default
value since version 2.2. For example, we found embedded
Linux relays which always retransmit SYN/ACK segments
four times, regardless of their backlog size. Second, we also
discard scans whose SYN/ACK retransmissions do not exhibit
Linux’s exponential backoff behavior. Third and finally, we
discard scans where the relay was offline or other networking
problems occurred. These three pruning steps discarded 774
out of all 2,094 scans (37%).
3) Traceroutes into China: We want to learn if there
are unfiltered routes leading into China. To investigate this
question, we used our Tor relay in Europe to run traceroutes to
numerous destinations in China. After a country-wide scan, we
obtained a list of 3,934 IP addresses in China that responded
to SYN/ACKs and were distributed geographically in a diverse
way, which served as our traceroute destinations. For every IP
address, we ran two TCP traceroutes; one whose TCP source
port was equal to the filtered Tor port 9001 and one whose TCP
port was set to the unused and unfiltered port 9002. The tracer-
outes had both their SYN and ACK bit set. We used a slightly
modified version of the tool hping3 [33] to run the traceroutes
as it allowed us to send TCP segments with a source port which
is bound by the Tor process.5 Starting on 4 May 2014, we
ran the traceroutes on an hourly basis for two days, resulting
in a total of 3, 934 · 24 · 2 · 2 = 377, 664 traceroutes. We
determined where the traceroutes entered China using whois
and round-trip time information. We culled out a small amount
of data that did not enter China through a known backbone
network, since all such data either appeared to enter China in
Pasadena, California (a case we can handle but will require
deeper analysis into whois records) or was destined for clients
that we determined to actually be in Hong Kong.
C. Good Internet citizenship
We took several steps to devise our scans to be minimally
invasive. First, we set up a web server on our measurement
machines whose index page informed visitors about our exper-
iments. The page contained our contact information to provide
alarmed network operators with an opportunity to contact us
and opt out of our measurements. Furthermore, we carefully
designed our measurements so that it is very unlikely that they
harmed any computers or networks. Throughout the lifetime
of our experiments, we did not receive any complaints. We
discuss ethical aspects of our measurements in Section VI-C.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We now analyze the three data sets we gathered; the hybrid
idle scans, the backlog scans, as well as the traceroutes into
China.
A. Hybrid idle scans
The hybrid idle scan data was collected from 15 March
2014 to 10 April 2014. One client was removed from the data
because we determined that it was in Hong Kong and as a
result not subject to the GFW’s filtering.
5We modified the tool to constantly increase the TTL of outgoing TCP
segments. The default behavior is to wait for every hop to reply with a “TTL
exceeded” ICMP message.
Fig. 6. The color temperature for clients corresponds to the number of
observed No-packets-dropped cases over the entire experiment. No geo-
graphic or topological pattern is visible. Instead, the distribution matches
the geographic Internet penetration patterns of China. (Map data c© 2014
Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME, SK planet, ZENRIN)
Table I shows the results of our hybrid idle scans. The
column S → C is short for Server-to-client-dropped, None
means No-packets-dropped, C → S means Client-to-server-
dropped, and Error simply means Error. In the table’s rows,
CN is short for China, EU means Europe, and NA means
North America. As for the server types, Tor−Dir is a Tor
directory authority, Tor−Relay is a Tor relay, and Web is a
web server. Our results confirm that, in general, SYN/ACKs
entering China from blacklisted IP address/TCP port pairs
are blocked. Some web servers were censored, and some Tor
nodes were censored outside China. This is to be expected
because even in countries that do not perform nation-scale
Internet censorship, organizations frequently take steps to filter
material such as pornography or file sharing sites. Note that
highly popular websites often contain material that is subject
to censorship.
The most interesting result from the hybrid idle scans is
that the No-packets-dropped case was measured all over the
country without any noticeable geographic pattern. The ge-
ographic distribution of observed No-packets-dropped cases
is shown in Figure 6. The case distribution closely matches
the distribution of our clients which, in turn, matches the
geographic Internet penetration patterns of China. This means
that the failures in China’s IP address/TCP port blacklisting
mechanisms are not limited to one region or one network
block. We provide a more thorough analysis in Section V-B,
which confirms Hypothesis 2.
We also observed that in many cases these filtering failures
are persistent and last throughout the day. We witnessed
four client/server pairs where all 22 measurements in a day
returned No-packets-dropped. We redacted the clients’ 16
least significant bits:
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 198.96.155.3 (CA)
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 161.53.116.37 (HR)
Client 58.193.0.0 (CN) → server 128.173.89.245 (US)
Client 121.194.0.0 (CN) → server 198.96.155.3 (CA)
This would give evidence towards Hypothesis 4, but our
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Fig. 7. The temporal association between cases of No-packets-dropped.
The x axis shows the amount of hours since the last No-packets-dropped
case whereas the y axis shows the probability of observing another case of
No-packets-dropped.
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Fig. 8. Spatial association between clients in China. The x axis shows
the neighborhood radius (k) and the y axis shows the Pearson correlation
coefficient.
traceroute results reveal that CERNET does not perform
the type of blocking we are measuring at all so later in
this section we will discuss similar failures in commercial
networks. Clients 58.193.0.0 and 121.194.0.0 are part of
the Chinese Educational and Research Network (CERNET).
Server 198.96.155.3 is a long-established Tor exit relay at the
University of Waterloo. 161.53.116.37 and 128.173.89.245 are
Tor relays in Croatia and the U.S., respectively. There were
also many instances where client/server pairs showed Server-
to-client-dropped for most of the day but also showed No-
packets-dropped once or a handful of times.
B. Temporal and spatial association
We now seek to answer the question of whether there are
any temporal or spatial associations among the No-packets-
dropped cases observed for Tor relays tested from within
China.
Temporal association is shown in Figure 7. The probabil-
ities are computed by a simple counting technique. We have
the hourly count of the number of No-packets-dropped cases
for each source. For each occurrence of No-packets-dropped,
we check if there are other No-packets-dropped cases in the
subsequent hours. We use 151 sources for this calculation,
excluding the educational sources, which contained 353 No-
packets-dropped cases in total. The final probabilities are
averaged over all sources. With the increase in the lag amount
in the x-axis, the probability decreases. This shows that No-
packets-dropped cases generally happen in bursts of hours.
TABLE II. BACKLOG SCAN RESULTS.
RST passes RST dropped
SYN passes 666 (80%) 39 (4.7%)
SYN dropped 68 (8.2%) 53 (6.4%)
Spatial association is shown in Figure 8. We use the latitude
and longitude of the sources as two-dimensional coordinates.
The curvature of the earth is ignored while computing the
distance between sources. For every source, we find the
geographically K-nearest neighboring sources and average
their count. We compute the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
between the count of No-packets-dropped cases for a source
and the average of the same for the neighboring sources. Note
that Pearson’s correlation has a range of −1.0 to 1.0. Our
maximum observed correlation value of 0.26 is, therefore, a
very weak positive correlation and supports the fact that there
is no significant geographical association between sources and
their neighbors. With the increase of the neighborhood radius,
the correlation decreases to below 0.1. Together with the fact
that the cases of No-packets-dropped are distributed fairly
evenly in all geographic regions (see Figure 6), this is strong
support for Hypothesis 2.
C. SYN backlog scans
We began our backlog scans on 24 March 2014 and ran
them twice a day with approximately 12 hours in between the
scans until 10 April 2014. We gathered a total of 2,094 scans
and after pruning, this effort yielded 1,320 scans (63%).
1) Reachable Tor relays: Out of all 1,320 backlog scans,
33 scans (2.5%) to 12 unique IP addresses contained the
respective Tor relay’s SYN/ACK segments, indicating that no
filtering was happening. Interestingly, 19 of these 33 scans
targeted the directory authority 128.31.0.39 on port 9131. Only
the RST scan and not the SYN scan yielded SYN/ACKs from
the directory authority.
The results in Table II show that, in general, if a RST
packet passes through the GFW then a SYN packet also
will. This confirms one of the basic assumptions behind the
hybrid idle scan, and confirms Hypothesis 1. Also, the fact that
most SYNs were allowed to pass through the GFW confirms
Hypothesis 3.
D. Traceroutes
Table III shows the results of our traceroute measurements.
In the table, “EDU” indicates that the first hop in China
in the traceroute is the educational and research network
backbone, CERNET (210.250.0.0/16 or 101.4.112.0/24) or
another scientific network called CSTNET (159.226.0.0/16).
“COM” indicates that the first hop in China was a commer-
cial backbone, one of: CNCGROUP (219.158.0.0/16), China
Telecom/CHINANET (202.97.0.0/16), China Mobile Com-
munications Corporation (211.136.1.0/24 or 221.176.23.0/24),
or the China Telecom Next Carrying Network backbone
(50.43.0.0/16). All other entry points were thrown out because
they were actually in Hong Kong or Pasadena, and that usually
indicated that the destination IP address was not in China
or non-Chinese routing hops had not been properly culled.
“Tor” means that the source port of the SYN/ACKs sent in the
TABLE I. RESULTS FROM THE HYBRID IDLE SCAN MEASUREMENT STUDY.
Client Server S → C (%) None (%) C → S (%) Error (%)
CN Tor−Relay 116,460 (81.52) 555 (0.39) 786 (0.55) 25,061 (17.54)
CN Tor−Dir 8,922 (64.91) 31 (0.23) 2,696 (19.61) 2,097 (15.25)
CN Web 306 (1.23) 15,663 (62.95) 2,688 (10.80) 6,226 (25.02)
EU Tor−Relay 18 (0.20) 8,589 (96.79) 22 (0.25) 245 (2.76)
EU Tor−Dir 2 (0.25) 776 (96.76) 0 (0.00) 24 (2.99)
EU Web 19 (1.23) 1,333 (86.28) 95 (6.15) 98 (6.34)
NA Tor−Relay 45 (0.39) 11,022 (94.48) 33 (0.28) 566 (4.85)
NA Tor−Dir 4 (0.37) 1,025 (94.73) 3 (0.28) 50 (4.62)
NA Web 32 (1.52) 1,794 (85.06) 98 (4.65) 185 (8.77)
TABLE III. THE RESULTS OF OUR TRACEROUTE MEASUREMENTS.
EDU Randport EDU Torport COM Randport COM Torport
Stalled 1,061 1,045 111,133 163,095
Finished 428 433 53,479 429
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Fig. 9. The amount of hops (log scale) in China, our filtered traceroutes
could traverse. For example, a hop count of five means that a traceroute could
successfully reach the fifth router inside China.
traceroute was the Tor port, and “rand” means that the source
port was another port that the GFW does not filter. Thus, “Tor”
traceroutes should always stop before the destination host if the
filtering is effective on that route, and “rand” should reach the
destination unless there are other types of filtering in play, such
as ICMP filtering or firewalls not related to censorship. The
elements in the table are the number of times that a traceroute
reached all the way to the destination.
Surprisingly, the educational and research networks, in
particular CERNET, do not seem to be implementing this type
of filtering at all. The “Tor” and “rand” columns are nearly
identical for the “EDU” traceroutes. The “COM” traceroutes,
however, show that commercial networks are clearly censoring
Tor by dropping SYN/ACKs. The “rand” traceroutes reached
their destination 53,479 times, while the “Tor” traceroutes
aimed at the same destinations only reached the destination
end host 429 times. Similar to the hybrid idle scan results,
these failures were all over the country and for any desti-
nation IP address where at least one failure was observed,
the number of failures ranged from 1 to 48 (i.e., all 48
hours of measurements). The number of failures in the most
prominent destinations where the traceroute entered China on
a commercial background included one instance where 48
failures were observed and two where 47 were observed. This
means that sometimes the failures are relatively persistent,
confirming Hypothesis 4.
Figure 9 shows the amount of hops into China, filtered
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Fig. 10. The amount of unfiltered traceroutes from our Tor relay to clients
in China over time. A diurnal pattern is visible.
“Tor” port traceroutes traversed before stalling. For each
measurement of each hour of each day, we only add the data
to Figure 9 if the “rand” traceroute reached the destination and
the “Tor” traceroute did not. In most cases, the filtered packets
make it two hops into China, confirming Hypothesis 6.
Figure 10 shows the number of failures for traceroutes
that entered China on the commercial network backbone,
per hour. The diurnal patterns apparent in the figure confirm
Hypothesis 5. Note that 02:00 UTC is 10:00 (or, 10:00 am) in
Beijing.
VI. DISCUSSION
We discuss three different aspects of our work in this
section: what we learned about the filtering of Tor in China,
what we learned about the architecture of the GFW, and ethical
considerations.
A. Filtering of Tor in China
Our results suggest that the filtering of Tor in China has
several interesting aspects, some of which may even be useful
for circumvention efforts. We showed that the failures in the
filtering occur in every part of the country, and they are
sometimes intermittent and sometimes persistent. A historical
example of intermittent failures is illustrated in Figure 11. The
diagram shows the amount of directly connecting Tor users in
China in the first seven months of 2013. A relatively stable
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Fig. 11. The amount of directly connecting Tor users over the first seven
months of 2013. The diagram shows several spikes and a “valley” in between
March and May.
“valley” in between March an May is clearly visible. This
valley is surrounded by significantly higher usage numbers.
We also showed that this type of filtering does not occur on
CERNET, the educational and research backbone of China’s
Internet. This might suggest that CERNET users can reach
the Tor network, or it might suggest that CERNET employs a
more sophisticated method for detecting and interfering with
connections to the Tor network, perhaps something stateful and
based on deep packet inspection.
Our results raise additional questions such as “is it possible
to run a Tor relay in China?”. In general, the Tor network
represents a complete graph. As a result, every relay should
be able to connect (and generally maintain connections) to
all other relays in the network. Furthermore, relays must be
able to connect to the directory authorities in order to upload
their server descriptors. If CERNET is indeed whitelisted, a
Tor relay inside CERNET might be able to successfully join
the Tor network. In addition, previous research suggested that
domestic Tor traffic in China is not subject to blocking [2].
If filtering indeed happens at the Internet exchange point
(IXP) level, as suggested by our data, it is not surprising
that the GFW is generally unable to filter domestic network
traffic as it typically does not reach IXP level6 and is of
significantly higher volume than international traffic. As a
result, functioning Tor relays or bridges inside CERNET might
be able to connect users in China to the rest of the Tor network.
B. The architecture of the GFW
Our results also shed light on the architecture of the
GFW, at least with respect to the mechanism that blacklists
IP address/TCP port pairs. As discussed in Section III, the
three theories about how the GFW is architected are that 1) the
filtering occurs at choke points where undersea cables enter the
country, 2) the filtering occurs in the backbone in large IXPs,
and 3) the filtering occurs at a regional level. While our results
show some filtering occurring many hops into China and some
filtering occurring before packets can even enter China, the
majority of the filtering happens about two hops into China
(presumably at the large IXP in Beijing). Thus, Hypothesis 6
is most consistent with the theory that the filtering occurs in
the backbone. Note that this observation is in accordance with
other recent research efforts which focused on the GFW’s DNS
injection [19]. The small amount of routes that are filtered
6We ignore routing phenomena such as “boomerang routing”.
at the provincial level, which were also observed by Xu et
al. [18], can be explained by the strategy employed by China’s
formerly second-largest ISP, CNCGROUP, which was recently
bought by the largest (CHINANET).
While whitelisting would appear as persistent failures in
the filtering and the filtering apparatus getting overloaded
with traffic would appear as intermittent failures, the mix
of intermittent failures and diurnal patterns with persistent
failures suggests that routing is a major reason why the filtering
fails. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are most consistent with the theory
that the filtering occurs in the backbone, because provincial
networks in China are very hierarchical [34] and undersea
cables are few in number [35]. Hypothesis 2 is also most
consistent with backbone-level filtering for this reason.
C. Ethical considerations
Our work has two ethical considerations that need to be
discussed. First, our SYN backlog scans briefly fill a Tor
relay’s backlog in order to be able to observe packet drops.
A full backlog can prevent a relay from accepting new TCP
connections or cause the use of SYN cookies which can lead
to reduced throughput. To prevent relays from using SYN
cookies, we adapted our scan parameters to minimize the risk
of completely filling a relay’s SYN backlog. SYN cookies
typically do not support scaled flow control windows, which
is why we made every effort to avoid them. In general, the
rate at which we are sending SYN packets, without intention
of completing a connection, is not enough to create a denial-
of-service condition on any modern network stack. For an
interesting discussion about ethical issues related to port scans
in general, we refer the reader to Durumeric et al. [36].
Second, our idle scans create unsolicited traffic between
a client and a server. This traffic—which can be observed
by the censor—is only SYN/ACKs from the server to the
client and RSTs from the client to the server. As a result,
we are not causing any meaningful communication other than
background noise as it is also caused by port scanning activity.
While one may conceptualize the hybrid idle scan technique as
providing the ability to conscript a client into performing tests
for us, in reality the traffic between the server and the client
is no different from if the server chose to send SYN/ACKs
to the client. Thus, in terms of the traffic that the censor
sees, the hybrid idle scan technique is no different from if Tor
relay operators performed simple connectivity measurements
by directly sending SYN/ACKs.
VII. RELATED WORK
As our work employs network inference techniques in order
to measure the reachability of the Tor anonymity network, we
divide related work in two subsections. The first subsection
focuses on similar network inference techniques, and the
second discusses the Great Firewall of China and Internet
censorship measurements in general.
A. Network inference techniques
There has been a fair amount of work on utilizing side
channels in TCP/IP network stacks. Antirez’s seminal IPID idle
scan from 1998 [37], [38] and other work on idle scans [26]
focus on network security. Qian et al. [39] show that some
firewalls exhibit behavior that can be used to infer sequence
numbers and hijack connections. Chen et al. [40] use the IPID
field to perform advanced inferences, such as the amount of
internal traffic generated by a server, the number of servers in
a load-balanced setting, and one-way delays. Morbitzer [41]
explores idle scans in IPv6. Queen [42] utilizes recursive DNS
queries to estimate the packet loss between a pair of arbitrary
hosts by measuring the packet loss between their respective
DNS servers. Reverse traceroute [43] is an interesting appli-
cation of indirect methods for Internet measurement.
Passively identifying hosts that have no routable IP address
and are hidden by network address translation [44], [45] is a
related problem to inferring connectivity of hosts.
iPlane [46] sends packets from PlanetLab nodes to care-
fully chosen hosts, and then compounds loss on specific routes
to estimate the packet loss between arbitrary endpoints. The
view of the network is fundamentally limited to the perspective
of the measurement machine, however. Queen [42] utilizes
recursive DNS queries to measure the packet loss between
a pair of DNS servers, and extrapolates from this to estimate
the packet loss rate between arbitrary hosts.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first use
of idle scan inference techniques for a large-scale Internet
measurement study where the data collected gives a view
of the network from the perspective of a very large number
of clients distributed over a large country. Platforms such
as DIMES [47], M-Lab [48], PlanetLab [49], and RIPE At-
las [50], [51] have traditionally been the only way to measure
from the perspective of a large number of clients, but they
can be very limited, especially in non-Western regions of the
Internet such as China. Our work overcomes a fundamental
limitation of Internet measurement: that measurements tradi-
tionally have only been possible from the perspective of the
measurement machines controlled directly by researchers.
B. The Great Firewall of China
The Great Firewall of China was first described in an
article in 2600 magazine [52]. In 2006, Clayton, Murdoch, and
Watson investigated the firewall’s keyword filtering mechanism
and demonstrated that it can by circumvented by simply
ignoring the firewall’s injected RST segments [6]. Clayton et
al.’s study was limited to how the filtering works. What it
filters was covered by Crandall et al. in 2007 [17], along with
more details about routing. Using latent semantic analysis, the
authors bootstrapped a set of 122 keywords which were used
to probe the firewall over time. The study also shows that
filtering is probably not happening at the border of China’s
Internet. Xu, Mao, and Halderman made an effort to pinpoint
where exactly the filtering is happening [18]. The authors
came to the conclusion that most filtering is happening in
border ASes but some filtering is also happening in provincial
networks. Park and Crandall revisited the GFW’s keyword
filtering mechanism and discussed why the filtering of HTML
responses was discontinued in late 2008 [7].
In addition to topology and HTTP filtering, another direc-
tion of research focused on how the GFW operates on the
TCP/IP layer. In 2006, Clayton et al. already showed that the
GFW is terminating suspicious HTTP requests using injected
RST segments. Weaver, Sommer, and Paxson showed that it
is possible to not only distinguish genuine from injected RST
segments but also to fingerprint networking devices injecting
the segments [53]. More recently in 2013, Khattak et al. probed
the GFW in order to find evasion opportunities on the TCP/IP
layer [54]. Resorting to techniques first discussed by Ptacek
and Newsham in 1998 [55], the authors showed that there
are numerous evasion opportunities when crafting TCP and IP
packets. Similarly, Winter and Lindskog showed in 2012 that
packet fragmentation used to be sufficient to evade the GFW’s
deep packet inspection [2].
In addition to the design and topology of the GFW, some
work focused on how the GFW blocks application protocols
other than HTTP. In 2007, Lowe, Winters, and Marcus showed
that the GFW is also conducting DNS poisoning [3]. A more
comprehensive study was conducted by anonymous authors in
2012 [4] and 2014 [19]. The authors sent DNS queries to sev-
eral million IP addresses in China, thereby demonstrating that
the GFW’s DNS poisoning causes collateral damage, i.e., in-
terferes with communication outside China. A follow-up study
was conducted in 2014—also by anonymous authors [19]. The
authors probed a large body of domain names to determine
how filtering changes over time. Furthermore, the authors
approximated the location of DNS injectors. Interestingly, their
results are similar to ours and they write that “In most cases,
the injecting interface manifested at either 2 (18.3%) or 3
(54.6%) hops inside China” (cf. V-D).
Most work discussed so far treated the firewall as a mono-
lithic entity. Wright showed in 2012 that there are regional
variations in DNS poisoning, thus suggesting that censorship
should be investigated on a more fine-grained level with
attention to geographical diversity in measurements [5]. In
addition to DNS and HTTP, the GFW is known to block the
Tor anonymity network. Using a VPS in China, Winter and
Lindskog [2] investigated how the firewall’s active probing
infrastructure is used to dynamically block Tor bridges.
In terms of Internet censorship measurements not aimed at
the GFW, there is a growing body of work but two works in
particular are notable from an Internet measurement perspec-
tive. Dainotti et al. [56] analyze several Internet disruption
events that were censorship-related using various data sources
from both the control and data planes. Dalek et al. [57] present
a method for identifying externally visible evidence of URL
filtering.
The most notable difference to previous work is that our
measurement techniques do not require control over either
machine which is part of censored communication. While that
enables large-scale distributed studies, it comes at the cost of
reduced flexibility.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have characterized the mechanism that
the Great Firewall of China uses to block the Tor network
using a hybrid idle scan that can measure connectivity from
the perspective of many clients all over China. We have also
presented a novel SYN backlog idle scan that can infer packets
received by a server without causing denial of service. These
novel Internet measurement techniques open up whole new
possibilities in terms of being able to measure the Internet
from the perspective of arbitrary clients and servers. This
is extremely important when it comes to characterizing and
documenting Internet censorship around the world, because
of the difficulty in finding volunteers geographically dispersed
throughout a country.
We also evaluated our techniques which led to several new
insights about the inner workings of the Great Firewall. Our
data shows that 1) at least several machines inside CERNET
(China Education and Research Network) are able to connect
to Tor relays, 2) filtering seems to be centralized at the IXP
level, and 3) filtering is quite reliable with the Tor network
being either almost completely reachable or almost completely
blocked in different parts of the country.
Our code is available at: http://cs.unm.edu/∼royaen/gfw/.
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